ABSTRACT
Partaking in social distancing can contribute to a public good affected by the perceived risk of infection and socioeconomic cost. Although social distancing can save lives by slowing down the disease transmission before introducing any effective medical intervention, the economic fallout of social distancing can be brutal for the poorest, vulnerable, and marginalized members of society. We combined the epidemiological and evolutionary game theoretical (EGT) framework through the consolidations of the SEIR (Susceptible-Exposed-Infected-Removed) disease model to analyze behavior enticements in a social distancing dilemma situation with the complex behavioral decision-making aspect. Extensive theoretical and numerical analyses reveal that socioeconomic cost and infected individuals' compliance behavior are critical factors in reining disease spread in the community. Lower cost for maintaining relative safety distance encourages maximum avoidance of public interactions by a detected infected individual. The benefitted fraction due to compliance is parted from the naturally immunized population. People get insignificant benefits from social distancing when the disease transmission rate is too low or crosses critical higher values. Average Social Payoff (ASP) analysis suggests the correspondence of significant safety distance with lowest cost setting as the best strategy to derive the maximum goods. But mounting inherent cost converts social distancing obedience to a public good dilemma.